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Employment Arbitration and Workplace
Justice
By LEWIS L. MALTBY*
Let's look at the record.
Al Smith
SOME CVIL RIGHTS lawyers look at the growth of employment ar-
bitration and see the end of workplace justice. Others see an exciting
opportunity to create workplace justice. How can this be possible?
How can attorneys with the same values see the same development in
diametrically opposite ways? The heart of the answer lies less in these
attorneys' different perceptions of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") than in their different perceptions of the civil justice system.
Different attorneys have conflicting opinions on how well the civil jus-
tice system provides workplace justice and these opinions shape their
attitudes regarding arbitration in the workplace.
Part I of this article examines civil rights lawyers' views on employ-
ment arbitration. It finds that most civil rights lawyers see the civil
justice system as successful because they are generally successful in
achieving justice for their employee clients. This section also explains
that those lawyers who view the civil justice system as a failure tend to
focus on the vast majority of employees with legitimate claims who
receive no justice because financial obstacles prevent them from ac-
cessing the courts. For the latter type of lawyer, employment arbitra-
tion is seen as a great opportunity for those employees who have been
denied access to courts to be heard and have a chance to be made
whole.
Part II examines the empirical data concerning the outcomes of
employment arbitration and employment litigation proceedings. This
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section finds that employees who arbitrate their complaints fare at
least as well as those who take their disputes to court.
Part III examines the issue of access to justice. While it is difficult
for many employees to obtain counsel to litigate their claims, an em-
ployee can arbitrate his or her claim with relative ease. This section
finds that many more employees are able to obtain justice through
arbitration than through litigation.
I. Civil Rights Lawyers' Views on Arbitration
Members of the plaintiffs' employment bar generally believe that
the civil justice system is a success. And why shouldn't they? Plaintiffs'
employment lawyers spend their lives filing cases on behalf of their
clients against employers. Most of the time they either win the case or
get substantial settlements. For them, the system works.
Viewed from this perspective, pre-employment arbitration agree-
ments are completely unnecessary. This applies not only to pre-dis-
pute agreements that are a condition of employment, which all civil
rights lawyers agree are ethically indefensible. It also applies to volun-
tary pre-dispute agreements. Moreover, since pre-employment agree-
ments are generally entered into without the advice of counsel, they
have the potential to create injustice. Employees, even sophisticated
ones, are seldom qualified to evaluate an arbitration system and deter-
mine if it is fair. They are unable to look at the due process protec-
tions provided and know if they are adequate. They are equally unable
to examine a roster of arbitrators and determine if it is balanced. If
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate become standard practice, the po-
tential threat to workplace justice is both real and substantial.
If the civil justice system is working, there is no reason to take
these risks. The development of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is
nothing but a threat, foisted upon workers by employers. It is a bad
thing and must be resisted. Someone with this perspective is bound to
see every aspect of current employment arbitration programs in a neg-
ative light.
Other civil rights lawyers see the world very differently. For these
attorneys, ADR represents an opportunity to bring workplace justice
to those to whom it is currently denied. They see not only the cases in
which the private bar achieves justice, but also the cases that the pri-
vate bar ignores.
In order for a member of the private bar to accept a civil case
against an employer, there must be provable economic damages (not
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including punitive damages) of at least $75,000.1 The vast majority of
employment cases do not meet this requirement. Employees unable
to hurdle this monetary obstacle are unable to obtain counsel, they
never see a courtroom, and they never receive justice. Paul Tobias, a
founder of the National Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA"),
testified before the Dunlop Commission 2 that the plaintiffs' employ-
ment bar turns away at least 95% of those employees who seek its
help.3 How can the civil justice system be working for employees when
95% of those with an employment dispute are never even able to ob-
tain counsel?
From this perspective, arbitration agreements are a potential op-
portunity. Arbitration is far less expensive than litigation and holds
the potential to bring justice within reach of most employees for the
first time. This does not eliminate the risks of pre-employment arbitra-
tion agreements, but suggests that they may be worth taking, espe-
cially if ways to minimize the risks can be found.
H. Empirical Data on Employee Success Rates
A. Results from Studies on Arbitration in the Employment Context
Ultimately, the facts speak for themselves-either employment
arbitration has delivered justice to employees or it has not. Fortu-
nately, a significant body of empirical evidence is now available to
demonstrate whether justice has in fact been achieved through
arbitration.
1. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims ofEmplyment Discrimination: What Really Does
Happen? What Really Should Happen ?, 50 Disp. REsOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 44. Howard's
data from 1995 showed a minimum level of provable damages of $60,000. Lewis Maltby
estimated this figure to have increased to at least $75,000. See Maltby, infra note 9, at 926.
2. The official name of the Dunlop Commission is "Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations." The Commission was announced by the Secretary of La-
bor and the Secretary of Commerce on March 24, 1993 to report on issues involving the
enhancement of workplace conditions and productivity, and the resolution of workplace
problems. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: PREFACE (1993), http://www.dol.gov/-sec/media/re-
ports/dunlop/preface.htm (last accessed Nov. 3, 2003).
3. Paul Tobias, Testimony Before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations: Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Apr. 6, 1994) [hereinafter
Tobias].
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1. AAA Arbitration
The first significant work in this area was conducted by Professor
Lisa Bingham of Indiana University.4 Professor Bingham found that,
in 1992, employees in arbitrations conducted by the American Arbi-
tration Association ("AAA")5 prevailed 6 in 73% of cases they filed
against their employers. 7 Two years later, Professor Bingham ex-
amined employee win rates in AAA arbitration again for the period
extending from 1993 to 1995. In this time span, employees won 63%
of the time. 8
Lewis Maltby, President of the National Workrights Institute, ex-
amined AAA records for 2000 and found that employees won 66% of
the time.9 Theodore Eisenberg, a law professor at Cornell Law School,
and Elizabeth Hill, a research fellow for the Center for Law and La-
bor, found an employee win rate of 43% in a sample of randomly
selected AAA cases from 1999 to 2000.10
It is difficult to completely harmonize these results. At first blush,
employee success rates might appear to be declining over time. The
first results, from Bingham's 1992 study (73%), are the highest of any
study. The employee success rate declined to 63% in 1993-1995 (Bing-
ham). It declined still further from 1999-2000 (Eisenberg and Hill), to
only 43%. While the most recent study (Maltby 2000) shows a re-
bound to 63%, this is still lower than Bingham's 1992 findings. How-
ever, from a statistical perspective, this interpretation is questionable.
Two declining data points followed by one raising data point does not
constitute a statistically significant trend. If a fourth post-Bingham
study were to be conducted, there is no way of telling whether the
4. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment
Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L L.J. CONFLIGr MGMT. 369 (1995).
5. The American Arbitration Association is the world's oldest and largest provider of
dispute resolution services. See Am. ARBITRATION Ass'N, ABOUT Us, available at http://
www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15729 (last accessed Nov. 3, 2003).
6. Bingham considered an employee to have "prevailed" whenever he or she re-
ceived ajudgment in his or her favor. See generally Bingham, supra note 4. This is the mean-
ing of "prevail," "won," and synonymous words that will be used throughout this article,
with reference to success rates.
7. See id. at 378.
8. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP.
POL'YJ. 189, 210 (1997).
9. Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in
Arbitration, in How ADR WORKS 915, 921 (Norman Brand ed., 2002).
10. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Em-
pirical Comparison, 2003 PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY REs. PAPER SERIES 1, 14, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.crm?abstractid=389780 (last accessed Oct. 6, 2003).
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resulting success rate of this study would be higher or lower than
Maltby's results.
Additionally, recent arbitration history suggests that there is no
reason to believe that employee success rates would continue to de-
cline if success rate studies were conducted in the future.
The only changes that occurred in AAA arbitration during the
time period in which these studies were conducted were: 1) the devel-
opment and adoption of the Due Process Protocol ("Protocol");"I and
2) the creation of a new roster of employment arbitrators by AAA.
Both of these developments, however, work to the advantage of em-
ployee plaintiffs and should have the effect of increasing their win
rate. The Protocol establishes minimum due process standards for em-
ployment arbitration. While AAA's pre-Protocol rules for employment
arbitration are not well documented, all concerned parties, regardless
of their attitudes toward employment arbitration, agree that the Pro-
tocol has improved due process for employees.
The same is true of the new rosters of employment arbitrators.
These rosters were assembled with the input of all concerned commu-
nities, including the plaintiffs' employment bar and civil rights law-
yers. Candidates who were not acceptable to all communities were not
selected. From an employees' perspective, the resulting new rosters
are better balanced than their predecessor lists.
The most logical explanation for the different success rates is that
the reported variations are simply the result of chance. The number
of employment arbitrations conducted by AAA in a single year is
under one thousand. 12 With a volume of cases this small, the percent-
age of meritorious cases filed could easily change significantly from
year to year. Moreover, in reaching their conclusions, none of the re-
searchers conducting the previously discussed studies used AAA's en-
tire employment caseload for the time periods at issue. For instance,
the largest study considered only 200 cases, while the databases for the
other three studies were even smaller. Based on these facts, it becomes
clearer that the change in employee success rates was probably pro-
duced by chance.
The critical question is, "How often do employees prevail in arbi-
tration?" None of these studies, taken individually, provides a clear
11. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), http:/
/adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15729 (last accessed Oct. 6, 2003).
12. Telephone interview with Bob Meade, Vice President, American Arbitration Asso-
ciation (Oct. 20, 2003).
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answer to this question. Each study simply represents a different slice
of the same data set and so each should be given equal weight. There-
fore, aggregating the data provides the most meaningful interpreta-
tion of the data. The total number of employment arbitrations
represented by all the studies was 557. Of these, employees won 346
cases, for a success rate of 62%.
2. NASD/NYSE Arbitration
Attorney Michael Delikat and Professor Morris Kleiner, from the
University of Minnesota, analyzed the results of arbitrated employ-
ment disputes that were handled by the National Association of Secur-
ities Dealers/New York Stock Exchange ("NASD/NYSE") from 1989
through 2002.13 Employees of most stockbrokers are required, as a
condition of employment, to resolve their employment disputes
through binding arbitration. NASD and NYSE have established their
own arbitration system for handling these claims. Delikat and Kleiner
found that employees prevailed in 44% of the cases they studied (572
cases). 14
Seven years earlier, researchers Stuart Bompey and Andrea Stem-
pel reported worse results for employees in NASD/NYSE arbitra-
tions. 15 In a sample of 62 cases, employees won only 22, a rate of only
36%.16 Aggregating the data in these two studies provides an em-
ployee success rate of only 43% (273 of 634). This is substantially
lower than the 62% employee success rate in AAA arbitration.
Currently, no definitive explanation has been uncovered for the
different employee success rates regarding AAA and NASD/NYSE
cases. It appears unlikely to be the result of chance, since Delikat and
Kleiner considered the entire set of NASD/NYSE employment arbitra-
tions from 1989 through 2002, which involved some 572 cases. Some
might argue that employees' lower success rates at NASD/NYSE
demonstrate that the system is not as fair as AAA's system. Others,
however, including some attorneys who represent employee plaintiffs
13. See generally Michael Delikat & Morris Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration
of Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 A.B.A. SEC. OF
LITIG. 1 (2003).
14. Id. at9.
15. See Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane




in the NYSE/NASD arbitration system, find little or no systematic un-
fairness in the NASD/NYSE system.17
There is also the distinct possibility of legally significant variations
regarding the fact patterns presented to each organization. NASD/
NYSE arbitrations all stem from a single industry. It would not be sur-
prising if the fact patterns involved in these arbitrations consisted
predominantly of contract disputes involving contracts that are highly
uniform in the security industry and distinct from the contracts used
in other industries.
The best explanation for the lower NYSE/NASD employee suc-
cess rates is that the cases brought to NYSE/NASD are not compara-
ble to those handled by AAA. We know, for example, that employee
success rates vary greatly depending on the legal theory upon which
plaintiffs lawyers' rely.' 8 AAA employment arbitration cases primarily
involve contract disputes. The NYSE/NASD arbitrations studies by
Bompey are exclusively statutory civil rights cases. The same is true of
the arbitrations studies by Delikat. As Eisenberg has demonstrated,
employee/plaintiffs with statutory civil rights claims prevail far less
often in court than those with contract claims. Thus, the lower success
rate for employees in NYSE/NASD arbitration appears to occur be-
cause the cases brought to this tribunal are more difficult for employ-
ees to win.
B. Results from Studies on Litigation
Employees' success rates in arbitration mean little in isolation.
They only become meaningful when compared to the success rates of
similar cases resolved through litigation.
Eisenberg and Hill recently demonstrated that employee success
rates, both in litigation and arbitration, vary dramatically with the le-
gal theory involved in each employment dispute. 19 Specifically, em-
ployee success rates were determined to be much higher in either
forum when the case involved a contract dispute, as compared to
when the case involved a violation of a civil rights statute. 20
It is therefore critical that litigation results selected for compari-
son to arbitration results deal with types of cases similar to those in-
volved in arbitration proceedings. The lion's share of AAA
17. Telephone interview with Patrick Sadler, President, Public Investors Arbitration
Association (May 1, 2002).
18. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 10, at 2. See discussion infra Part II.B.
19. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 10, at 16.
20. Id. at 17-19.
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employment arbitrations involves contract disputes. 21 Claims that an
employee's statutory civil rights have been violated are far less com-
mon. 22 As part of the research for this article, I examined the records
of the thirty eight AAA employment arbitrations that formed the basis
for my article, The Myth of Second-Class Justice.23 Of these thirty eight
cases, only five involved statutory civil rights disputes. Almost all of the
others were based on contractual claims. Hill reported that, within
other samples of AAA cases she studied, only 1.8% to 7% involved
statutory civil rights claims. 24
The fact that very few employment arbitrations involve civil rights
disputes requires that we use litigation results from non-civil rights
employment cases for comparison to arbitration results. Eisenberg
and Hill analyzed the results of state court employment trials in 1996
from the Civil Trial Court Network, a project of the National Center
for State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 25 The databases of
the courts of general jurisdiction, as compared to the databases of the
civil rights cases from federal courts, dealt with cases that more clearly
resembled AAA cases.
The success rate of employee plaintiffs in these state court em-
ployment disputes was 57%.26 This is slightly lower than the 62% suc-
cess rate achieved by employees in AAA arbitrations. It is difficult,
however, to attribute any significance to this small difference. The
fairest conclusion that can be drawn is that employees have as equal a
chance of winning a state court trial as they do an AAA arbitration
proceeding.
C. Effect of Summary Judgment
The conclusion that success rates in arbitration and litigation are
equal, however, applies only when an employee plaintiff in civil court
has a trial.27 However, many employees in civil court do not receive a
trial. The majority of employment cases in federal court, some 60%,
21. See Maltby, supra note 9, at 923.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 921.
24. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777,
804 (2003).
25.. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 10, at 7-8.
26. Id. at 14.
27. The conclusion that employee plaintiffs win equally as often in arbitration as in
court, reached on the basis of trial and hearing results, is correct only if employees in both
systems always receive a trial or receive a hearing on the merits with the same frequency.
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are resolved on summary judgment.28 Employers win 98% of these
summary judgment motions. 29 In state court, the number of employ-
ment cases dismissed on summary judgment is much lower-only
15%.30
This does not occur in arbitration. Summary judgment in AAA
arbitration is so rare as to be statistically insignificant.3' Virtually all
employees who take their disputes to AAA arbitration receive a hear-
ing on the merits.
This additional factor--Lhe effect of summary judgment-re-
quires a complete rethinking of the comparison of arbitration success
rates to litigation success rates. The question is not, "How do employ-
ees who go to court and get a trial fare compared to employees who
use arbitration?" The real question is, "How do all employees who take
their disputes to court fare compared to all employees who take their
disputes to arbitration?"
Looking at the data from this perspective reveals that 62% of all
employees who turn to AAA arbitration achieve a decision in their
favor. To create a comparable figure for litigation, we must factor in
the rate of summary judgment for those cases that are analogous to
those going to arbitration. Twenty two percent of AAA's employment
caseload consists of federal civil rights cases. 32 The remainder of the
caseload is made up of contract claims and other legal disputes that
more closely resemble state court claims. A weighted average analysis
produces a rate of summary judgment in litigation, regarding those
cases comparable to AAA's cases, of 25%. 33
This has important implications for comparing AAA results to liti-
gation results. Since 25% of litigated cases would have been dismissed
on summary judgment, only 75% of these cases would have gone to
28. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Database, case cate-
gory 442 jobs (July 11, 1997) (on file with author), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/in-
dex.html (last accessed Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Inter-University Database].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Maltby, supra note 9, at 917.
32. Telephone Interview with Bob Meade, Vice President, American Arbitration Asso-
ciation Uune 24, 2003).
33. 78% of AAA's employment docket consists of cases that are dismissed on summary
judgment by courts at a rate of 15%. See Inter-University Database, supra note 28. This means
that 11.7% of AAA's docket would have been dismissed on summaryjudgment if the cases
had gone to court. The remaining 22% of AAA's employment docket consists of cases that
are dismissed on summary judgment, at a rate of 60%, by courts. See id. This means that an
additional 13.2% of AAA's cases would have been dismissed on summary judgment had
they gone to court. Thus, a total of 24.9% of AAA's employment would not have survived
summary judgment.
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trial. The 57% of cases employees were found to have won in court
thus represents only 43% of the total cases brought by employees. See
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Success Rates of All Employee Plaintiffs
Arbitration Litigation
Total Cases 100% 100%
Dismissed on Summary Judgment 0% 25%
Cases Tried 100% 75%
Win Rate 62% 57%
Wins as a % of Total Cases 62% 43% (57% of 75%)
It is critical to remember that the source of all the arbitration
data used in this analysis was the AAA. The AAA is well known for
maintaining a roster that includes arbitrators of the highest quality,
who scrupulously follow the Protocol. While other large providers of
arbitration, such as JAMS/Endispute and the National Arbitration Fo-
rum, may match AAA's quality, it is almost inconceivable that all of the
hundreds of providers in this unregulated field meet AAA's high stan-
dards. The above analysis shows that arbitration can provide victory
rates that are as good or even better for employees than courts can
provide. It does not prove that arbitration generally provides the high
victory rates reported in this article.
D. Size of Awards
Even if employees are more likely to win in arbitration proceed-
ings than in court, this does not prove that arbitration is better for
employees than litigation. Justice is not achieved merely because a de-
serving employee has won his or her case. Justice is served only if the
amount the employee has received from a victory is fair, in terms of
the harm the employee has suffered.
Initial figures on the amounts employees typically receive as the
result of favorable arbitration decisions raised serious concerns. Pro-
fessor Bingham found that the mean damages awarded by AAA arbi-
trators from January 1993 to December 1995 was $49,030. 34 By
contrast, the mean damages awarded by district courts, for this same
time period, was $530,611. 35 These findings seem to indicate that,
34. Lisa B. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power: An Alternative Account for the Repeat
Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, 50 INDUS. RPEL. RES. ASS'N PROC. 33, 38 (1998).
35. Inter-University Database, supra note 28.
[Vol. 38
ARBITRATION SYMPOSIUM
while employees win more often in arbitration than in court, arbitra-
tion judgments under-compensate prevailing employees.
Insight gained from later research indicates that this analysis is
too crude to be meaningful. The cases handled by AAA are mostly
contract dispute cases and so are primarily economic in nature. 36
Such cases offer very little opportunity for an arbitrator to award com-
pensatory or punitive damages. The employment cases handled by
federal district courts, in contrast, are predominantly statutory civil
rights cases that frequently call for such damages. 37
More recently, Eisenberg and Hill compared the size of the
awards in AAA arbitration proceedings to the size of awards in state
court employment cases. The median AAA award was $63,120, while
the median state court award was an almost identical $68,737.38 The
mean awards, however, were quite different. The mean AAA award
was around $153,000, 39 but the mean state court award was about
$462,000.40 This indicates that most employees who prevailed in arbi-
tration received awards comparable to what they would have received
in court, but a few employees who took their claims to court received
very large awards that they would not have received from arbitration.
These large jury awards, however, are seldom received in full by
prevailing employees. It is commonplace for a trial court judge to re-
duce the size of a jury award against an employer. It is also routine
practice for employers to appeal large trial court awards and use the
cost and delay of appeal as a bargaining tool. Some experienced trial
lawyers have estimated this "shrinkage" to be in excess of 50%. If these
estimates are correct, the difference in mean awards would be re-
duced greatly, and might be eliminated altogether.
III. Arbitration Provides Workers with Access to Justice
The number of people who receive justice is equally as important
as the quality of justice they receive. A dispute resolution system that
renders perfect justice but cannot be accessed is worthless. Unfortu-
nately, our civil justice system is approaching this sad state, where the
system has become inaccessible to people-especially employees. Paul
Tobias has testified that at least 95% of employees who come to the
36. See Maltby, supra note 9, at 923.
37. See Bingham, supra note 34, at 34.
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private bar seeking help are turned down. 41 Many of these employees
are rejected because they do not have a case.42 .Under the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, an employee can be treated in a completely ar-
bitrary and unfair manner without having a legal claim against his or
her employer. 43
In many cases, however, the employee does have a valid legal
claim and cannot obtain counsel for financial reasons. Most people
cannot afford to hire an attorney on an hourly basis, even when they
are employed. For an attorney to accept a case on a contingency fee
basis, the potential recovery and the probability of victory must be
high enough to justify the substantial investment of time required to
prosecute the case. A 1995 survey of plaintiffs' attorneys found that a
prospective plaintiff needed to have a minimum of $60,000 in prova-
ble damages-not including pain and suffering or punitive dam-
ages-before an attorney would take his or her case. 44 With inflation,
this minimum has grown to an estimated $75,000.
Most employees with valid complaints do not have individual
damages claims that amount to $75,000. The average annual income
of American employees is $26,500,45 and the vast majority of people
who lose their jobs are unemployed for six months or less. 46 This
means that most employment claims, including those that are merito-
rious, involve less than $13,000 in damages. Such claims involve mone-
tary amounts that are far below the minimum amount that the private
bar can afford to accept cases upon.
Arbitration is much less expensive, allowing attorneys to accept
much smaller cases, in terms of the damages involved in the cases. For
example, Hill's analysis of 200 AAA cases found that the median de-
mand in cases where the employee was represented by counsel was
$75,000. 4 7 This is the same as the minimum demand for an attorney
to take a claim to court. Since, by definition, half of any data set falls
41. Tobias, supra note 3.
42. Id.
43. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., 1 EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.1 (4th ed.
1998).
44. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 29, 57 (1998).
45. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 2003 EMPLOYMENT SITUATION
SUMMARY, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (last accessed Oct. 6, 2003).
46. Lewis L. Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the Model Employment Termination
Act, in 536 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: EM-
PLOYEE DISMISSAL: JUSTICE AT WORK 103, 116 (Richard D. Lambert ed. & Stuart Henry spe-
cial ed., 1994).
47. Hill, supra note 24, at 821 tbl.19.
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below the median, 50% of the employment claims attorneys took to
arbitration would not have been filed in court.
Even this, however, understates the case. In litigation, attorneys
routinely seek awards that are greater than their client's actual dam-
ages in order to give themselves room to negotiate. Thus, the mean
actual damages in the arbitrations studied by Hill were less than
$75,000. While this effect cannot be quantified, it is safe to say that the
number of employees who are able to afford their day in court with
arbitration (under Hill's analysis) more than doubled, as compared to
the number of people who attempt to litigate their cases.
This conclusion is also supported by Maltby's analysis of all AAA
employment cases decided in the year 2000.48 This analysis revealed
that the majority of arbitration claims studied involved less than the
$75,000 attorneys require to take a case to court.49 Many cases (26%)
involved claims of less than $25,000. Once again, the number of em-
ployees who were able to bring their arbitration claims, compared to
those who were able to litigate their claims, appears to have doubled.
Arbitration also increases access to justice in an indirect manner.
Most employment arbitration proceedings represent the last step in a
multi-staged process. While this process varies from company to com-
pany, these steps can include one or more rounds of internal review
by executives other than the decision maker, review by other employ-
ees, and mediation. Most employment disputes that arise at compa-
nies that employ an arbitration system are resolved to the employee's
satisfaction without him or her ever having had to resort to arbitra-
tion. Thus, the number of disputes that are resolved through the for-
mal arbitration process is only a fraction of the total number of
disputes that are resolved through the various initial stages of employ-
ers' ADR systems.
Conclusion
The data currently available shows that the results of quality em-
ployment arbitration compare well to the results of employment litiga-
tion. More than twice as many employees can afford to take their cases
to arbitration as can afford to litigate those same cases. Moreover, em-
ployees who arbitrate their claims are 50% more likely to win than
those who go to court. And the size of the award successful employees
48. See Maltby, supra note 46, at 115-17.
49. Lewis Maltby, Arbitrating Employment Disputes: The Promise and the Peril, in ARBITRA-
TION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 530, 533 (Daniel P. O'Meara ed., 2002).
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receive in arbitration is comparable to the judgments most prevailing
employees receive in court. The only negative for employees who arbi-
trate their employment disputes may be that extremely large awards
are less common in arbitration.
This does not mean that the civil rights community should accept
employment arbitration in its present form. Arbitration as a condition
of employment is wrong and should be opposed. All employee rights
advocates should continue to push for legally required due process
protection in arbitration.
However, it would be a terrible mistake to eliminate the use of
arbitration as a tool for addressing and resolving employment dis-
putes. Employees are more likely to have their day in court in arbitra-
tion than in litigation and are more likely to receive justice when the
day is over. Employment arbitration needs to be preserved and im-
proved, not abandoned.
